/ Publication · INTERPOL · Global Investigations Review
Interpol's viability rests on fairness
Secretary General Valdecy Urquiza inherits two entrenched problems: the abuse of Red Notices and Diffusions for political or commercial ends, and the inadequacy of the mechanisms by which those abuses can be challenged. Writing in Global Investigations Review, Maryna Pogibko, Mykhailo Grydzhuk and Edward Henry KC examine whether the revised Article 135 dispute settlement procedure goes far enough — and propose an independent review body, modelled on the CCF, as the structural reform the institution's credibility now requires.
Full article can be accessed here: Global Investigations Review — Interpol's viability rests on fairness.
Interpol's Secretary General, Valdecy Urquiza, faces two entrenched problems that have long undermined the organisation's credibility: the abuse of Red Notices and Diffusions by member states for political or commercial purposes, and the inadequacy of the mechanisms available to those seeking meaningful relief. Writing in Global Investigations Review, the authors examine whether recent procedural reforms go far enough to address these failings.
The article analyses the revised Article 135 dispute settlement procedure, which now establishes two formal categories of inter-state dispute and introduces clearer admissibility requirements, defined timelines and an express rule on the relationship between Article 135 proceedings and individual applications to the Commission for the Control of Interpol's Files (CCF). These are welcome clarifications. However, a critical gap persists: there is no mechanism by which a member state can challenge the General Secretariat's decision to approve data submitted by another state — meaning that politically motivated notices, once authorised, are largely insulated from inter-state challenge.
The authors also examine how Article 135, though designed as an intergovernmental tool, can in practice offer faster protection for individuals (journalists, dissidents or human rights defenders) than the CCF route, particularly when a sympathetic NCB is willing to raise a formal protest. Yet the confidentiality of the entire process means there is no visible jurisprudence, no published outcomes and no accountability. The authors call for anonymised summaries of concluded cases and aggregate data on outcomes as a minimum standard of transparency.
The deeper structural problem, the authors argue, is that in disputes between a member state and the General Secretariat, the review is conducted by the very department that issued the contested decision, with the Secretary General as the final arbiter. The institution acts simultaneously as party and adjudicator, an arrangement that compromises perceived impartiality regardless of the good faith of those involved. The authors draw on the example of FCPA-linked Red Notices, where Interpol's practice has been inconsistent: rejecting some requests on Article 3 neutrality grounds while approving others involving equally politicised contexts, such as the PDVSA prosecutions.
The solution proposed is an independent review body modelled on the existing CCF structure: a separate, ad hoc panel, structurally insulated from the General Secretariat, capable of reviewing Article 135 disputes with genuine impartiality. Without this, the authors warn, member states that perceive systemic bias may progressively reduce their cooperation with Interpol, ceding influence to better-funded regional bodies such as Europol, Afripol and Ameripol. Interpol's viability as a global institution, they conclude, depends on its ability to demonstrate that no member state's requests receive preferential treatment.
